Match-manipulation in football - the challenges faced in Finland by unknown
ARTICLE
Match-manipulation in football - the challenges faced in Finland
Johanna Peurala
Published online: 8 October 2013
 The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract During the last few years, an increasing number
of match-manipulation cases in different sport disciplines
have been detected all over the world. Also in Finland there
have been, during the very recent years, cases of match-
manipulation in football. Match-manipulation is not a new
phenomenon in Finland; at the turn of the millennium,
some clubs in Finnish pesa¨pallo (a special type of baseball)
faced allegations of betting-related match-manipulation. As
a result of these allegations, twenty persons, all of them
Finnish nationals, were sentenced for fraud in 2001. As a
result of these very recent cases of match-manipulation in
football in Finland sentences have been imposed for brib-
ery in business. This research analyses match-manipulation
in football. It aims to provide a deep and systematic ana-
lysis of the phenomena by discussing its magnitude, link to
transnational organised criminality as well as the reasons
and the motivations behind the phenomenon. The research
identifies different modus operandi of match-manipulation,
also highlighting the points of vulnerability. The emphasis
of the research is on the prevention side and the focus is on
Finland. The aim is on mapping and analysing the Finnish
legal responses against match-manipulation, the Finnish
criminal code 19.12.1889/39 and the relevant criminal case
law are in the centre of the research. A short comparative
part is presented to illustrate the Nordic perspective on
combating the phenomenon. A hybrid of methods is used:
legal dogmatics, criminological theories and criminal pol-
icy views are combined. This research works as an opener
for further research of match-manipulation in Finland, in
Scandinavia and also globally.
Keywords Match-manipulation  Match-fixing 
Corruption  Bribery  Football  Finland
1 Introduction
… attempts to manipulate sports results, including in
an organised manner and at the international level,
constitute an important threat for the integrity of
sport. (Council of Europe 2012)
Match-manipulation1 is not a new phenomenon in sport.
But during the last years, a number of match-manipulation
cases have been detected all over the world. The Internet
has revolutionized the sport betting markets making bet-
ting-related match-manipulation an attractive mean for
criminals, such as the transnational2 organised crime3
(hereafter: TOC) groups to gain money or to launder it to
finance their activities. The TOC groups have recently been
involved in many cases of betting-related match-manipulation
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1 In this research, the term match-manipulation is used to refer to
manipulations, where bribes are paid to some person(s) to manipulate
different aspects of the match. This term is regarded as a wider term
than match-fixing, which refers to the fixing of the result of the match.
2 Transnational crimes refers to crimes committed across different
jurisdictions (Rawlinson 2009).
3 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, Resolution 55/25 (2000) defines OC as meaning a structured
group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious
crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit.
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all over the world. Only a few years after the large match-
manipulation scandal in Germany, the Bochum-case,4 Euro-
pol, in February 2013, informed that it has, with the help of
national police teams from different European countries,
uncovered a large criminal network involved in almost 400
cases of match-manipulation in football in Europe and in 300
matches outside Europe (Europol 2013). Nineteen out of 27
Member States of the European Union (hereafter: EU) and
four Candidate Countries have been recorded to have cases of
match-manipulation (Bozkurt 2012).
Based on court data, there have not been many cases of
match-manipulation in Finland. In some of these match-
manipulation cases, the Finnish National Betting Operator,
Veikkaus,5 has been deceived. However, because of the
emergence of (legal and illegal) betting sites on the Inter-
net, matches can be manipulated in Finland and bet abroad.
The involvement of TOC groups in match-manipulation
and their use of Internet for betting the manipulated aspects
of the match are new phenomena that bring more chal-
lenges to national law enforcement authorities and legis-
lators. And Finland is not the only country facing these new
challenges.
1.1 Aim, materials and methods of the research
Although there is a great deal of academic research made
on different aspects of corruption, the phenomenon of
match-manipulation, which is one form of bribery, has
been subject to only a few academic legal or criminological
studies.6 The knowledge about the phenomenon is tenuous
not only among law enforcement authorities but also a
potential target of the bribes and the general public.
Research on the subject is needed. For example, no Scan-
dinavian academic literature on match-manipulation in
football has come to the knowledge of the author.
This research aims to provide a deep and systematic
analysis of the phenomena of match-manipulation in
football. The magnitude of match-manipulation, its link to
TOC as well as the reasons and the motivations behind this
manipulation are discussed. The research identifies differ-
ent modus operands of match-manipulation. After this
general view of the phenomenon, concentration is paid on
mapping and analysing the Finnish legal responses against
match-manipulation, emphasising the Finnish criminal
code (19.12.1889/39; hereafter CC) and the relevant
criminal case law.7 The prevention side of the match-
manipulation is emphasised. The actions and actors to
prevent match-manipulation are discussed both in Finland
but also at regional and international level. The research
highlights points of vulnerability of Finnish football to
match-manipulation. In addition, it is asked what has been
done in Finland to tackle this phenomenon and whether
there is seen room for improvement.8
The concentration of the research is on the match-manip-
ulation in football affecting the run of the match or on its
outcome. The emphasis is put on the visible criminality and
mainly on the bribery side in the match-manipulation phe-
nomenon. The non-competition corruption, as Maenning
(2005) calls it, i.e. corruption related to the decisions by
sporting bodies and sports officials regarding the host venues
for competitions, allocation of broadcasting rights, nomina-
tion for positions or commissioning construction works for
sporting venues, is not discussed. Also the trafficking of young
players is excluded from the research. The information is
presented as it is on the 20th of September 2013.
This piece of research uses a hybrid of methods: it
combines legal dogmatics, criminological theories and
criminal policy views. A legal dogmatic method9 is
employed to analyse, to interpret and to systematise the
statutory offences of bribery in business. The analysis is
carried out on two levels: (1) the offences of bribery in
business related to match-manipulation are analysed as
normative offences, as defined in the Finnish CC and (2) as
decisions of the Finnish courts.10 These two aspects
4 The Bochum-case involved 351 suspected persons from 25
different countries.
5 At the turn of the millennium, Finnish pesa¨pallo (a special type of
baseball) faced allegations of betting-related match-manipulation. As
a result of these allegations, twenty persons were sentenced for fraud
in 2001 (Court of Appeals R 01/2825, 6 February 2003). In this case,
the Finnish National Lottery, Veikkaus, was deceived. There is also
another court case (CoA R08/1275) where Veikkaus has been
deceived. There was no international dimension in either of the cases.
6 The academic literature in the field of match-manipulation is scarce.
Hill discusses match-manipulation in his book: Hill (2010). See also,
Hill’s scientific article about the roles of internal corruptors: Hill
(2009). But there are manifold reports on match-manipulation made by
regional and international actors, as referred later in this study. Except
for the article by Pihlajama¨ki (2008) Yksityisen sektorin lahjonta. 4
DL, the research concerning bribery in Finland has mainly concen-
trated on the public sector. Two studies concerning the match-fixing in
pesa¨pallo in Finland have been made, and these are both theses:
Matikainen (2006); and Sarvikivi (2006) Vedonlyo¨nnin rikosoikeu-
dellisen vastuun ongelmakohdat urheiluvedonlyo¨nnissa¨. Turku, Turun
Yliopisto. In Finland, there have been no academic texts written on
match-manipulation in football except the very recent thesis by Jouko
Ikonen (2013) 1x2 - varma voitto - jalkapallo-ottelun manipulointi.
Turku, Turun yliopisto.
7 The translations of Finnish legislation and case law used in this
research are unofficial translations.
8 This type of research is called de lege ferenda research.
9 Legal dogmatics is the interpretation and systemisation of legal
rules and weighing and balancing legal principles and other legal
standards. For more about the legal dogmatics, see Hirvonen (2012)
and Siltala (2002).
10 The structure of Finnish judiciary in criminal law matters: The
District Court is the lowest court; the Court of Appeals is the appellate
court; and the High Court is the highest court in Finland. Appeal to
the High Court is restricted by a leave to appeal system.
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constantly influence each other.11 Some criminological
explanations, the routine activity theory and the strain
theory are presented to understand the motivations of the
criminals, like the TOC groups, involved in match-
manipulation. Previously criminological theories have not
been employed to analyse the motivations behind match-
manipulation. Criminal policy views are brought when
analysing effectiveness current laws on match-manipula-
tion and the penalties given. The approach of this research
is interdisciplinary and thus challenges the conventional
normative approach within criminal law science.
The empirical part of the study consists of the criminal
court cases on match-manipulation in the twenty-first
century in Finland. The space does not allow for a full
comparative analysis, but a short comparative part is pre-
sented to illustrate the Nordic perspective on combating
match-manipulation: the new Swedish legislation on brib-
ery as well as the Norwegian Action Plan Against Match-
Fixing are discussed in Chapter 7.
2 Corruption and sports
… the nature of sport itself, based on fair-play and
equal competition, requires that unethical practices
and behaviors in sport be forcefully and effectively
countered (Council of Europe 2012).
Sport is vulnerable to corruption because, especially in
professional sport, it involves large amounts of money
(Bures 2008). The sums spent on sports betting are of
growing interest to TOC groups. (Brasseur 2012) Match-
manipulation is one form of corruption. Bozkurt (2012) sees
match-manipulation as very interesting for TOC groups
because of its relatively high revenues and short sentences.
Football is an ideal context for corruption because of the
economic interests, the arbitrariness of decision-making by
referees and the natural variation of human performance on
the playing field (Della Porta and Vannucci 2012). Cor-
ruption can be found in different areas of sport. It can
emerge as match-manipulation, misuse of inside informa-
tion or corrupted elections in sporting bodies, and so on.
(Bures 2008) Match-manipulation is found to also happen
in other sports than football; cricket, horse-racing and tennis
are usually seen as being vulnerable to manipulation.12
Match-manipulation can have devastating effects on the
sport, not only eroding the certain uncertainty associated
with the sport. But once the public and the spectators have
the widespread perception that a certain sport, sporting
event, or club is corrupt, they will abandon it,13 and the
sponsors and the TV-broadcasters will follow (Hill 2010).
Match-manipulation may erode confidence of the public if
they perceive that manipulated sports results give benefits
mainly to the individuals behind this manipulation
(Council of Europe 2012). Thus, deterring match-manipu-
lation is necessary to protect the integrity of sport, to
maintain a trustworthy gaming industry and to combat
against TOC (Norwegian Action Plan against Match-Fix-
ing 2012).
The bribery is mainly hidden criminality (Huisman and
Walle 2010). Thus, the match-manipulation is also to a
great extent hidden criminality and the recorded cases of
match-manipulation may not tell the whole truth of its
scale either globally or in Finland. Maenning (2008)
emphasises that, globally speaking, the known cases of
match-manipulation represent only the tip of the iceberg.
One reason for this can be that sporting organisations may not
want to bring these cases to light, because they fear it being
financially detrimental to the clubs because they worry that
sponsors may abandon the discipline (Hill 2008).
Although the Study on match-fixing in Sport (KEA
European Affairs 2012) found that match-manipulation is
criminalised in all Member States of the EU, the crimi-
nalisation of the different forms of actions relating to
match-manipulation varies greatly from one country to
another. The countries where bribery has been identified as
the main offence in on-going investigations or in judicial
proceedings on match-manipulation are Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Finland and France (Kalb 2011). In Fin-
land, non-betting-related match-manipulation offences are
prosecuted as bribery in business (Chapter 30, section 1–4,
of the Finnish CC). If Veikkaus is deceived, the provision
of fraud (Chapter 36, section 1 or 2, of the Finnish CC) is
applied.
3 Match-manipulation
Match-manipulation means removing the unpredictability
associated with sports results (Kalb 2011). There is no
uniform definition for match-manipulation (KEA European
Affairs 2012). However, an agreed definition of match-
manipulation would enhance the understanding of the
problem. (Council of EU 2012) In this research the fol-
lowing definition is used:
Match-manipulation covers the arrangement or an
alteration of the result of a match or any manipula-
tion occurring relating to the run of the match in
order to obtain any advantage, financial or non-
11 The law forms a hermeneutical circle. For more, see Hirvonen
(2012). For English literature on the doctrine of legal sources in
Finland, see Aarnio (2012).
12 See, for example, Smith (2012). 13 See, for discussion the situation in Albania, Boniface et al. (2012).
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financial, for oneself or for another, and remove all
or part of the uncertainty normally associated with
the match.14
It is commonly seen as the financial advantage (either
money or expensive merchandise) being the motivation of
the target of the bribe to engage in match-manipulation. In
addition, match-manipulation may include other advanta-
ges offered/given like sexual favours, more playing time or
threats or violence may be used (Interpol 2012).
There are various types of match-manipulation. Boni-
face et al. (2012) have identified three different modus
operands in match-manipulation in football: (1) fraud in
sport at the grassroots level; (2) institutional fraud in sport;
and (3) exogenous sporting fraud, which involves criminal
gangs outside the sport. In the first type of manipulation, a
team’s coach plays the main role in the bribery. The coach
sets out to bribe the coach or a player from the opposing
team. The bribery is attempted by directly contacting the
coach or the players of the opposing team. In the type of
modus operandi where corruption is institutionalised in the
club or in the federation, a club may contact the referee of a
match or a player on the opposing team or the chairman of
the opposing club and try to bribe him/her. The traditional
way is to buy the match, in other words, to make sure
which team wins. The bribe can be made by contacting
players directly or by having targeted players approached
first by a sports person (current or ex-player) or agent,
someone the players know, and then by a club manager or
chairman who will suggest the deal. The chairman or the
players can themselves place bets or sell inside information to
OC groups (Boniface et al. 2012). The third type of modus
operandi is discussed later in more detail in Chapter 4.
Match-manipulation can occur both at the professional
and the amateur level. The classic example is to fix the
result of the match, to buy a match, i.e. decide who will
lose or win, while the parties involved in this fixing bet on
the result of the match. But match-manipulation is more
than mere cheating to lose or a decision who will win.
Other means of match-manipulation include: the team line-
up may not be the best possible15; match-manipulation may
involve limiting the number of goals, and this certain goal
difference is bet on; and spot-fixing. Spot-fixing refers to
an illegal agreement on a specific action during a
competition (Brasseur 2012). Some sports-betting opera-
tors accept bets on the number of yellow/red cards, or the
first or last player to receive these cards, the number of
minutes of additional time, the name of the first substitute
to come onto the pitch, and so on. Because such happen-
ings do not affect the final score, the players may agree
more readily to this type of manipulation. Furthermore, the
performance of the players may be affected, e.g. a team
doctor can be bribed to dose the player(s), or the stadium
technicians can be bribed to turn the electricity off to freeze
the result. In addition, one way is that the chairman or the
players sell the inside information they have to outsiders,
e.g. to the OC groups (Boniface et al. 2012).
Cases of match-manipulation may involve the bribery of
referees, players, team managers, agents, ex-players, club
executives, physiotherapists or doctors.16 Van Megen
(2012) concludes that on several occasions ex-players have
been involved in match-manipulation. These ex-players
may be in financial difficulties after ending their careers,
and they may have a lot of respect among young players
whose trust they can abuse. Furthermore, it is possible that
the bribes are paid systematically and regularly (like the
second salary) to the players of a certain club, thus sys-
tematically manipulating the matches of the club and
placing bets on those matches. When this happens, the
corruption can be seen to have institutionalised in the club
or in the federation (Boniface et al. 2012).
Greed and fear are motivation factors behind accepting
the bribes (Smith 2012). TOC groups can use threats
against their potential targets to make them accept bribes.
The players or other members of the club may be extorted.
The clubs and players in difficult economic straits are
potential targets for match-manipulation (FiFPro 2012).
Many players lack financial security because their contracts
are fixed term (usually only for one season or even less).
The FiFPro (2012) study demonstrates a clear link between
non-payment of players’ salaries and match-manipulation.
According to this, the longer a salary is in arrears, the
greater is the risk for the player to participate in match-
manipulation.17 In the District Court (R11/900) case, the
defendants said that the temptation to accept the bribes
offered was great because they considered their salaries
low. In 2011, in Finland, the average salary for a player in
14 This definition is based on the definition of manipulation of sports
results established in Recommendation CM/Rec (2011) 10 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on promotion of the
integrity of sport against manipulation of results, notably match-fixing
(adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 September 2011 at the
1,122nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
15 In this type of bribery, there is a question of misuse of inside
information because the bettor has inside information about the
abilities of the players and the line-ups when betting (Boniface et al.
2012).
16 Van Megen (2012) argues that the football authorities tend to see
only players being involved in match-manipulation.
17 According to a FiFPro (2012) study concerning Eastern-Europe,
the players whose clubs pay salaries on time are less often approached
by match-manipulators. The study demonstrates that 55 % of
respondents whose club does not pay salaries on time have been
approached to consider manipulation for the result of a match.
Whereas, among the respondents who were never approached with
this kind of a proposal, 39.7 % of them state their club does not pay
salaries on time.
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the Veikkausliiga, the top division of Finnish football, was,
including fringe benefits, EUR 19.230 a year.18 Seventy-
five percent of the players were playing fulltime, and 35 %
of the players earned less than EUR 9.600 annually (Jal-
kapallon pelaajayhdistys 2011).
Bribing a referee is less certain and usually more
obvious than bribing a player. The referee is often bribed
after a person fails to bribe the players (Boniface et al.
2012). Indeed, in football, one player cannot affect the
result of a match as much as a referee. In match-manipu-
lation in football, five to seven players of a certain club are
normally involved in match-manipulation—at least the
goalkeeper, a defender and a striker (Hill 2008). Maenning
(2005) observes that based on the revealed match-manip-
ulation cases, referees and other officials are nowadays
more commonly involved in match-manipulation, whereas
athletes and trainers are more seldom directly involved. He
found in his study an increased amount of cases of man-
agement corruption in sport.
The majority of the betting-related match-manipulation
that occurred in Europe during 2000–2010 has concerned
category B sports and leagues. A reason for this can be that
it is more difficult to manipulate Premiership players and
officials because of the great media attention paid on these
actors, as well as the security around Premiership players
(Gorse and Chadwick 2011). However, in February 2013,
Europol (2013) revealed that it had, with the help of
the national police from various European countries,
detected football matches suspected to have been manip-
ulated. These suspected matches have been e.g. World Cup
and European Championship qualification matches, two
UEFA Champions League matches and various top-flight
matches in different European national leagues. So, it
seems that manipulation can happen at all levels of foot-
ball, also at the very top.
4 Betting-related match-manipulation
Because of the hidden nature of bribery, the magnitude of
match-manipulation is subject to conflicting, varying and
inaccurate estimations.19 Maenning (2008) argues that
there is no proof that corruption in sports has increased
during the past years. He sees that the increased public
awareness on the issue and the improvements in interna-
tional communications technologies can explain that more
and more cases are being revealed and that information on
match-manipulation is more available. The criminal juris-
prudence concerning the manipulation of the results of
sporting events is relatively rare in the EU27 (KEA
European Affairs 2012), like in Finland.
There are only few academic studies on the magnitude
of match-manipulation. Gorse and Chadwick (2011) have
evaluated the prevalence of corruption in international
sport. Using a database of 2089 proven cases of corrup-
tion (doping crimes were seen as one form of corruption
in this study) between the years 2000 and 2010, they
found 57 cases of match-manipulation. Of these, 2.73 %
concerned betting- and non-betting-related match-
manipulation and 1.63 % misuse of inside information for
betting purposes. Over half of the cases took place in
Europe and one-third in Asia. Seventy percent of the cases
which occurred in Europe concerned football. In the
FiFPro (2012) study, 11.9 % of the Eastern-European
professional football players participating in the survey
(n = 3357) admitted that they had been approached by
individual(s) who wanted them to involve in match-
manipulation.
4.1 International betting
The liberalisation of betting markets, the establishment of
new methods for betting, along with developments in
betting technologies have created greater risks for the
manipulation of sports results (Brasseur 2012).20 Betting
on football has grown exponentially in the last five years
(Small 2012). On the Internet, based on the information
from the year 2006, it is estimated that out of 14823 active
gambling sites in Europe, more than 85 % are operated
without a licence (Cert-Lexsi 2006). According to Hill
(2008), the main problem is that the Asian-based OC
groups bet on the Asian gambling market,21 not with the
European national lotteries. McLaren (2011) sees the gam-
bling through non-regulated bookies as the main source of the
problem of betting-related match-manipulation.
As a result of fierce competition among online betting
sites, complex, but attractive betting modes have been
invented.22 Through the Internet, sports betting pay-out
18 In Finland, the average monthly income in the private sector in
2011 was EUR 3.328. Tilastokeskus Suomen virallinen tilasto:
Yksityisen sektorin kuukausipalkat 2011. ISSN = 1798-3894. http://
www.tilastokeskus.fi/til/yskp/index.html (Accessed 22 Feb 2013).
19 Bribery benefits both parties and, thus, it is in the interests of both
parties to keep it in secrecy.
20 For more about developments in betting markets, see Forrest et al.
(2008).
21 The runner take bets and transfer them to the regional bookmak-
ers who manage the betting finances by placing bets with supra-
regional betting houses. These physical markets have now been
replaced by Internet sites (Boniface et al. 2012).
22 The most dangerous betting formulas for match-manipulation are
Asian totals, i.e. will there be more or less than X goals scored during
the match; and what will be the goal difference between two teams
(Kalb 2011; Brasseur 2012).
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rates can be more than 90 %, thus making it extremely
attractive to money launderers (Kalb 2011).
Live betting represents over two-thirds of current
sports betting markets. Live betting is difficult, or almost
impossible, to control because of constantly changing
odds. Tracking the manipulation is difficult. Further-
more, the matches may be directly influenced from the
spectator stand by using different codes (Boniface et al.
2012).
For example, the regulation of licensed operators falls
within the sole jurisdiction of the EU27. But the extensive
availability of illegal gambling is a cross-border prob-
lem.23 The main problem is that betting is regulated at the
national level, although today the bets are placed with
online betting sites all over the world. Because of the
Internet, the betting markets have become more difficult
to regulate. The illegal betting-site operators, as well as
unregistered operators, are not subject to any surveillance
(Boniface et al. 2012). They are outlawed and potentially
dangerous by undermining the integrity of sports as well
as the legal betting industry.
The risk of being caught for this betting-related
match-manipulation is low because the money trail in
betting-related match-manipulation crosses different
jurisdictions (Norwegian Action Plan against Match-
Fixing 2012). Thus, international police co-operation at
the pre-trial investigation phase, like establishment of the
inter-state Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), in uncover-
ing match-manipulation cases is essential. Although
creating more opportunities for criminals, the technology
helps in detecting them; for example, monitoring systems
may be used to find abnormal changings in betting
patterns.
4.2 Motivations of match-manipulators
In match-manipulation, two different types of motiva-
tions by the briber(s) may be distinguished: (1) direct
financial motivation, which is linked to gambling (betting-
related); and (2) indirect financial motivation (non-betting-
related) (Kalb 2011). In betting-motivated cases of the
match-manipulation the briber(s) achieves economic gain
indirectly from the sport through betting activity. A defeat
can be very profitable if the team loses by a substantial
margin, because bets on greatly differing scores are
lucrative (Boniface et al. 2012; Bures 2008) This betting-
related match-manipulation can be motivated either by
greed or by money laundering. The OC groups may launder
their illegal moneys or they seek profit-making opportu-
nities (Rawlinson 2009). Non-betting-related match-
manipulation is seen as sports-motivated, because the aim
of the manipulation is to achieve a direct advantage from
the result, i.e. winning a match or qualifying for a higher
level of a competition (Kalb 2011).
The criminological theories can explain the motiva-
tions behind the betting-related match-manipulation. The
strain theory, by Robert Merton (1968), sees the criminal
(illegal) behaviour to be a way to achieve the desired
goals in society because achieving those goals is not
possible by legitimate means for that individual. For
example, betting-related match-manipulation by the TOC
is one way for making good money to fuel its illegal
businesses. The field of betting-related match-manipula-
tion is, at least currently, less regulated and subject to
fewer controls than, for example, the trafficking of
humans, drugs or weapons.
Routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) sees
that a crime occurs when three factors are present: (1)
motivated offenders; (2) availability of suitable targets or
victims; and (3) the absence of capable guardians. Bet-
ting-related match-manipulation can be very lucrative, the
money works as motivator. By target hardening or by
removing one of these three factors, the crime should be
prevented. When it comes to betting-related match-
manipulation, the occasions for criminals have never been
greater than today. Sports betting on the Internet offers
criminals various opportunities and large sums of money
are involved. When matches are manipulated in different
countries and betting takes place on the Internet, the risks
for criminals getting caught are not great. It should be
emphasised that there is a clear need for a permanent
intergovernmental structure for the surveillance and
monitoring of sports betting being offered on the Internet
(Boniface et al. 2012).
4.3 Roles of TOC groups in match-manipulation
The betting-related match-manipulation, when involving
OC groups, is at the focal point of three transnational
crimes: OC, money laundering and corruption. TOC groups
can pay bribes to manipulate matches, and bet on these
results, aiming to launder illegally obtained money and/or
to finance their activities.
Recently, Asian-based TOC groups have been involved
in match-manipulation in different parts of Europe, with
the aim of manipulation matches and betting on them.
These TOC groups have targeted clubs, players and mat-
ches at all levels, for example, in Europe. The criminal
organisations are not vertically integrated, but TOC groups
work like a network (Grabosky 2009). There are,
23 Joint open letter by the three associations EL, ECA (European
Casino Association) and EPMA (European Pari Mutuel Association)
to Commissioner Michel Barnier, sent on the 23rd January 2013.
http://www.european-lotteries.org/announcement/open-letter-commi
ssioner-michel-barnier (Accessed 19 Feb 2013).
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nowadays, many complex, transnational networks to
facilitate criminal activity across jurisdictions (Newburn
2007). The most important persons are the ones who
occupy certain ‘nodal’ points in this network (Rawlinson
2009). According to Hill (2008), the illegal Asian gambling
industry is led by an influential businessman or politician
who provides protection for OC groups and bookies from
the government and the police.
The literature identifies different approaches used by
TOC groups in match-manipulation: (1) a direct
approach, i.e. threats or offers of money in exchange for
a poor performance in a match; (2) an indirect
approach, like the use of intermediaries to contact the
person aimed to be bribed; and (3) OC groups them-
selves arrange matches (e.g. friendship matches) whose
only purpose is to obtain money from the betting
markets. This second type of an approach is demon-
strated by Hill (2008), as following: when bribing,
match-manipulators often use intermediaries (usually
ex-players, agents or persons otherwise known in sports
circles) to approach players or the officials of the
club(s). These intermediaries may select players who
are in financial straits or at the end of their careers
(Boniface et al. 2012). After the intermediary has met
the member of the club, this corrupt club member is
contacted by the bookie. The bookie tells this particular
member the amount of the bribe and the match con-
cerned, as well as the other club members who this
particular member should have as accomplices. When
the bribe and the outcome of the match have been
agreed, the TOC group bet on the result of this match in
international betting markets. (Hill 2008) This type of
betting-related match-manipulation has happened in
Finland.
A strong link has been detected between the football
establishment and OC groups, especially in Eastern Eur-
ope and the Balkans. (Bozkurt 2012) A classic scenario of
betting-related match-manipulation in Europe by Asian
OC groups aiming to launder their illegal money is
illustrated by Kalb (2011). He sees that an illegal orga-
niser in Asia who is connected to OC co-operates with
‘‘A worldwide network of sports ‘friends’ managed from
the Balkan Peninsula’’, i.e. bribers, and they try to find a
sports team in Western Europe which has financial
difficulties.
5 Match-manipulation in Finland
The poor financial situation of Finnish football clubs has
drawn the attention of the Finnish media several times in
recent years. It is a global phenomenon that to acquire the
best players the clubs are forced to offer high salaries and
sometimes spend more money than they have, thus find-
ing themselves in financial difficulty (Boniface et al.
2012). Clubs in financial difficulty are a common target
for match-manipulators. In recent years, at least one Asian
OC group have been involved in match-manipulation in
Finland.
The Veikkausliiga24 is Finland’s premier division in
football. The management of the Veikkausliiga, is dele-
gated to an independent association, Jalkapalloliiga ry
(Football League). In the twenty-first century, there have
been approximately 14 teams in the Veikkausliiga (with
some exceptions). In 2010, there were 80 foreign players
in the Veikkausliiga, of whom 37 % were Africans and
14 % were from Eastern Europe. (Jokiranta 2012) The
Veikkausliiga is played between April and the end of
October, when most of the other series are on holiday.
This may attract bettors from all over the world (Hill
2010).
In Finland, the referees of the football matches are
paid remuneration, (possible) daily allowance and
kilometre allowance by Suomen Palloliitto ry (the
Finnish Football Association, hereafter: Palloliitto).25
Palloliitto educates the referees. The observers of the
referees (also paid by Palloliitto) are present at every
match of the Veikkausliiga and League One, and some
of the matches of the 2nd Division and women’s league.
After each match, the observers of the referees give
both oral and written feedback of the performance of
the referees.
Veikkaus is the Finnish state lottery and the betting
operator. According to Chapter 3, section 11, of the Lot-
teries Act (1047/2001), Veikkaus has a monopoly to execute
betting games in Finland. It operates lotto games, pools,
betting games, instant games and other draw games. Vei-
kkaus has different betting games: pitka¨veto,26 voittajaveto
and tulosveto. It offers betting in the Veikkausliiga, as well as
24 The Veikkausliiga has issued the General terms of contracts
(YSE), intended to be part of the contract signed by every player.
Provision 13 of the YSE includes a ban on betting for the player (even
through an agent) on matches of a player’s own club. However, in
Finland there are matches, which are subject to betting, that involve
the players who do not have a contract which prohibits them from
placing bets on their own team.
25 Palloliitto, a member of FIFA and UEFA, is a special organisation
for football in Finland. It manages League One and all other leagues
or competitions.
26 According to the rules of pitka¨veto, the betting agreement between
the player and Veikkaus takes effect when the bet has been placed on
the online system and thus forwarded to the data system of Veikkaus.
The only criminal court cases in Finland concerning betting-related
match-manipulation, in which Veikkaus was one party, involved the
use of pitka¨veto, a fixed-odds game. CoA (01/2828) and CoA (R
08/1275).
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in lower divisions of football, even in the second division.
However, betting on the lower division matches is subject to
stricter regulations.27
Betting operators may have their own monitoring sys-
tems to monitor trends in betting exchanges. The abnormal
trend in the betting exchange may be a sign that excep-
tional inside information is used by bettor(s). This is not,
however, unequivocal evidence of match-manipulation
because dramatic changes in line-ups can affect the betting
exchange. And an alert by a monitoring system does not
constitute proof of match-manipulation. For example, if
Veikkaus perceives some exceptional betting patterns, then
it contacts Palloliitto or Jalkapalloliiga ry and searches for
international information regarding the betting patterns on
those particular matches. Veikkaus also constantly shares
information with its international partners, such as the
European Lottery Monitoring System (ELMS).28 (Ilmivalta
and Sundstro¨m 2012).
5.1 Cases of Match-Manipulation in Finland
The table illustrates all the court cases of match-manipu-
lation in football in Finland until the end of year 2012. All
these cases, except one, have been examined by both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals (hereafter: CoA)
(Table 1).
In these court cases, the targets of bribery have been
both the Finnish and the foreign players. The manipulation
has happened only in the men’s series in the Veikkausliiga
and in lower divisions. In all these cases, the bribes have
been bribes of money. In none of the cases have there been
bribed or attempted to bribe a referee, although referees
have also been a common target of bribery in cases abroad
(like in the mentioned Bochum case). As Boniface et al.
(2012) highlight, the referee has an important role relating
to the run of the match, because he alone makes the
decisions, since video refereeing is lacking and decisions
with linesmen are not mandatory. They also emphasise that
the decisions by referees are subjective; for example,
sending off the player can dramatically change the course
of a match. Thus, more emphasis in Finland should be
given to the possibility that referees can also be the target
of bribery.29
Only one form of match-manipulation, of the three
different modus operandi illustrated by Boniface et al.
(2012), has not appeared in Finland based on this data. In
Finland, there have been no cases in which corruption can
be seen to have institutionalised in the club or federation.30
In Finland there is only one court case on match-
manipulation in football where Veikkaus has been
deceived. This falls with the category betting-related
match-manipulation at the operational level, introduced by
Boniface et al. (2012). In the case, the court regarded that
N, a Finnish national and one coach for football club W (a
team in the second division), and L, a Finnish national, a
friend of N, had deceived a representative of Veikkaus (in a
retail outlet) when they played pitka¨veto in round 23/2004.
At the time of the betting, they knew that W would lose an
upcoming match with Z (a football club in the second
division), because W’s best goalkeeper was not going to
play (a decision taken by N). CoA (R08/522) argued that
the probability of W to draw or to win would have been
greater if the first goalkeeper would have played. The court
concluded that N and L had obtained unlawful financial
benefits for themselves. They played four different triples31
in pitka¨veto for a total of EUR 63.000 (630 coupons) and
with every coupon they bet for a loss by W. As a result of
these bets, L and N won EUR 208.550 (550 coupons). The
CoA (R 08/1275) found N and L guilty of aggravated
fraud. N was convicted for conditional imprisonment for a
year and a month for aggravated fraud and two different
offences of bribery in business. L was convicted for
27 A player who bets on the Veikkaus website on the Internet is
subject to mandatory identification. According to Finnish law, if a
bettor plays in the location of an authorised Veikkaus representative
(such as in a shop, a kiosk, etc.), then the bettor has to reveal her/his
identity if the bet involves over EUR 3.000. (Lotteries Act [1047/
2001] and Chapter 2, section 7 of the Act on Preventing and Clearing
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 18.7.2008/503.) For
example, in Norway, the bettor is always subject to identity
identification. Chapter 3, section 23 of the Act on Preventing and
Clearing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 18.7.2008/503
also imposes obligations for gaming operators referred to in
section 12(1) of the Lotteries Act (1047/2001), to report suspicious
transactions. Since 2004, Veikkaus has offered live betting. However,
this includes betting only on the playing aspects of a match. Live
betting is subject to strict regulation; the ceiling of daily betting per
player is EUR 300 (Ilmivalta and Sundstro¨m 2012). The person is
subject to identification when winning EUR 1.000 or more in games
of Veikkaus and if s/he is not registered by Veikkaus (2012).
Veikkaus monitors the betting in all areas in which it offers betting.
For example, as a means of risk management, Veikkaus does not
allow betting on every match. However, betting on friendship
matches is permitted. Veikkaus can close the betting on a certain
match if deemed necessary, e.g. because of exceptional patterns in the
betting (Ilmivalta and Sundstro¨m 2012).
28 FIFA, UEFA and many national football associations use the early
warning system Betradar to reveal exceptional behaviours in betting
patterns.
29 See, news about the suspected bribery of a referee in UEFA
Europa League first qualifying round match between FC Inter Turku
and Vı´kingur on 11 July 2013 in Finland. UEFA suspends two
Armenian officials, 7 August 2013, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/
disciplinary/news/newsid=1979667.html (Accessed 17 September
2013).
30 In that case, the liability of a legal person (Chapter 9 of the Finnish
CC) could be applied.
31 At that time, it was only possible to bet triples in pitka¨veto, not
singles.
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aggravated fraud and bribery in business for a conditional
sentence of a year.
Nowadays, a match played in Finland can be subject to
betting around the world. As an example: In 2006, M, a
Russian national, was the goalkeeper for the football team
X, which belongs to the first division of football in Finland.
M took EUR 1.500 in cash from an unknown person. In
return, M assisted his team into losing its match with Q.
The bets placed on this match in the English betting
exchange were considerable: 97.65 % of the bets laid were
for a Q victory and the betting exchange was over EUR
300.000, which was many times larger than the normal
exchange in such matches. M’s behaviour in the game was
not considered normal by football experts. The CoA (R08/
522) ruled that M had accepted a bribe for favouring or as a
reward for such favouring, through his/her function or
duties, the briber or another. M was convicted for accep-
tance of bribes for conditional imprisonment of four
months. The Disciplinary committee of Palloliitto imposed
a fixed-period ban of playing on M (Urheiluoikeuden
yhdistys 2008).32
Another case also illustrates this. It was suspected that
H, a Hungarian national, who offered a bribe, was an
intermediary whose motive was to acquire monies from
international betting markets. However, in the pre-trial
investigations, H’s background was not scrutinised,
although it was agreed that H himself did not have large
sums of money. In that case, H either promised or offered
S, also a Hungarian national and the goalkeeper for Z, a
bribe of EUR 15.000 if S would play in a way that would
negatively affect the outcome of Z’s game against F. S did
not accept the offer. H was sentenced for bribery in busi-
ness by the CoA (R 10/72). The Disciplinary committee of
Palloliitto did not handle this case.
6 Actions against match-manipulation in Finland
For cases of betting- and non-betting-related match-
manipulation, provisions of the Finnish CC concerning
bribery, more specifically bribery in business, and fraud, if
Veikkaus is deceived, are applied. Next, the kinds of
Table 1 Court cases of match-manipulation in Finland pre-2013





2009 CoA No Passive bribery in business 30:8 4 months conditional imprisonment
2009 CoA No A: 29 active bribery in business and
aggravated fraud
30:7 A: 1 year and 1 month conditional
imprisonment
B: Active bribery in business and
aggravated fraud
36:2 (1) B: 1 year conditional imprisonment
2011 CoA No Active bribery in business 30:7 5 months conditional imprisonment
2011 District
Court
No appeal A: Passive bribery in business 30:8 A: 7 months conditional
imprisonment
B: Passive bribery in business B: 7 months conditional
imprisonment
2012 CoA Yes, sentences of all the defendants
except F were reduced
A: Passive bribery in business 30:7 A: 1 year conditional imprisonment
B: Passive bribery in business 30:8 B: 10 months conditional
imprisonment
C: Passive bribery in business 5:3 C: 1 year conditional imprisonment
D: Passive bribery in business 5:6 D: 8 months conditional
imprisonment
E: Passive bribery in business and
abetting active bribery in business
6:5 (1)–(2) E: 8 months conditional
imprisonment
F: 39 active bribery in business,
forfeiture, border offence,
obstruction of a public official
(33:1, 17:7,
16:3)
F: 2 years imprisonment
Active bribery refers to bribes that are given or offered by the person in question, whereas passive bribery refers to the person in question being the target
of the bribery
32 The Disciplinary Committee of Palloliitto can impose sanctions
relating to the playing aspects. This Committee can impose penalties,
such as a temporary ban on playing, based on Section 2(h) of
Disciplinary regulations 2013 for persons involved in match-manip-
ulation. Disciplinary regulations 2(h) impose an obligation to report to
Palloliitto or to a club if someone is approached to manipulate a
match. However, no sanctions have been imposed in Finland under
Footnote 32 continued
this 2(h). (Personal correspondence with Petteri Lindblom, the lawyer
of Palloliitto. 15 February 2013). In Finland, the court cannot impose
a ban of playing. But, for example, in Spain, the punishment includes
six months to four years imprisonment, disqualification from one to
six years and a fine of up to three times the gains obtained by the
illicit activity (KEA European Affairs, 2012, p. 49–50).
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problems that may arise when applying the essential ele-
ments of bribery in business to the cases of match-
manipulation are illustrated. But, first, the actions and
actors to counter match-manipulation in Finland are
discussed.
6.1 Actions and actors to counter match-manipulation
in Finland
Although, in Finland, a systematic match-manipulation
prevention programme (partners to it are Veikkaus, Vei-
kkausliiga and Palloliitto) has been in use since 2007,33
match-manipulation is not mentioned in the current gov-
ernment platform, in any national anti-crime strategy or in
any action plan. This shows that placing the problem of
match-manipulation on the political agenda has not been a
priority in Finland, although there would be a need for it.
Finland does neither have specific laws regarding
match-manipulation nor any special anti-corruption organ.
However, establishing a special independent organ to
combat corruption in sports in Finland could be one option
to deter and to detect match-manipulation. This organ
could handle ethical questions, raise awareness about the
issue, organise training to deal with different aspects of
corruption in sports, give advice about corruption-related
questions in sports, and provide a hotline for corruption
issues,34 as well as to conduct surveys and research the
issue. Veikkaus could also inform this organ whenever
irregular behaviour in betting patterns is observed. On the
other hand, if the anti-corruption agency were established
in Finland, the prevention of match-manipulation would
fall under its competence.
6.2 Criminalisations - Bribery in business
The High Court of Finland has not given any decision in
the cases on match-manipulation, thus, High Court prece-
dents are lacking. The Finnish CC sections on bribery in
business date back to the beginning of the 1990s, and the
travaux preparatoires are silent on the application of the
sections to the match-manipulation cases.35 Although the
new sections concerning the aggravated forms of bribery in
business were added in 2011 (Law 637/2011), the match-
manipulation issue was ignored.
The application of the bribery sections to match-
manipulation cases has, to this day, meant that lower court
judges have had to interpret the wording and the meaning
of the sections of bribery in business within the limit
imposed by the legality principle. Next, the wording of the
sections and their interpretation in courts are illustrated.
An active form of bribery in business is criminalised in
Chapter 30, section 7, of the Finnish CC:
A person who promises, offers or gives an unlawful
benefit (bribe) to (1) a person in the service of a
businessman, (2) a member of the administrative
board or board of directors, the managing director,
auditor or receiver of a corporation or of a founda-
tion engaged in business, or (3) a person carrying out
a duty on behalf of a business, intended for the
recipient or another, in order to have the bribed
person, in his/her function or duties, favour the briber
or another person, or to reward the bribed person for
such favouring, shall be sentenced for bribery in
business to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two
years.
On the 1st of October 2011, sub-section (4) criminalis-
ing the bribery of foreign arbitrators was added to Chap-
ter 30, section 7, along with a new provision in Chapter 30,
section 7a, concerning the aggravated form of bribery in
business. The maximum penalty for this aggravated form
of offence is four years imprisonment; the minimum is four
months. As aggravating factors36 are seen if:
(1) the gift or benefit is intended to make the person
act in service contra-ry to his or her duties in a
manner which would result in a considerable benefit
to the briber or to another person or in a consider-
able loss or detriment to another person, or (2) the
gift or benefit is of significant value and (3) if bribery
in business is aggravated also when assessed as a
whole.
The mere offer of a bribe materialises the essential
elements of bribery in business. As an example: N, one
coach for W, a football club, offered the coach of football
club G around EUR 17.000 if G would lose the match. The
coach of G did not accept the bribe. N also offered a
goalkeeper of football club C EUR 3.000 if they would lose
the match against B. The goalkeeper of C did not accept the
33 The program details are not public.
34 In Finland, there is very recently established a warning system to
combat match-manipulation. For more, see: FIFPro News. FIFPro and
Finnish players union test match-fixing app. 16 July 2013. http://
www.fifpro.org/news/news_details/2310 (Accessed 17 September
2013)
35 The bribery in business was criminalised in 1991 (Law 769/1990).
36 As to compare: in Bulgaria, concerning aggravated forms of
bribery, as aggravating circumstances are seen, for example, when
offences are committed relating to a participant in a sports compe-
tition who is under 18 years of age; to or by a person who is a member
of a managing or controlling body of a sports organisation, or
involving a referee, delegate or another person undertaking their
official duties or functions. Also, the fixing of results by persons under
the instruction of OC group(s) is a criminal offence. Penalties with a
maximum of 10 years imprisonment are imposed if the acts involve
betting on the progress or on the outcome of a sports competition
(KEA European Affairs 2012).
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bribe. Meanwhile, L, a friend of N, offered a considerable
sum of money (the amount unknown) to the goalkeeper of
football club V if the team would lose two matches. This
bribe was not accepted either. Regarding these offences,
the CoA (R 08/1275) found N and L guilty of bribery in
business.
The passive form of bribery in business is criminalised
in Chapter 30, section 8, of the Finnish CC:
A person who (1) in the service of a business, (2) as a
member of the administrative board or board of
directors, the managing director, auditor or receiver
of a corporation or of a foundation engaged in
business, (3) in carrying out a duty on behalf of a
business, or (4) as an arbitrator resolving a dispute
between corporations, other parties or a corporation
and the other party 37 demands, accepts or receives a
bribe for himself/herself or another or otherwise
takes an initiative towards receiving such a bribe, for
favouring or as a reward for such favouring, in his/
her function or duties, the briber or another, shall be
sentenced for acceptance of a bribe in business to a
fine or to imprisonment for at most two years.
The maximum penalty for the aggravated bribery in
business (Chapter 30, section 8, of the Finnish CC)38 is
four years imprisonment; the minimum is four months.
Aggravating factors are similar to those in Chapter 30,
section 7, of the Finnish CC.
6.2.1 Are Finnish football clubs carrying on business?
In Finland, the football clubs can be either limited com-
panies or registered associations. Thus, when they are
registered associations, there are conflicting arguments as
to whether the football clubs can be regarded as carrying
on business as referred to in Chapter 30, sections 7 and 8,
of the Finnish CC. Neither Chapter 30, section 7–8, of
the Finnish CC nor Government Bill 66/1988 defines for
the term carrying on business.39 In examining the issue, the
District Court (R07/7286) referred to the preamble of
the Unfair competition offence (Chapter 30, section 2, of
the Finnish CC), which states that carrying on business
refers to professional activity for the purpose of financial
gain. The Court considered the income of football club X, a
registered association, as consisting of sponsor contracts,
tickets, the selling of refreshments and income from selling
the players. Expenses were the remuneration given to
players, coaches and supporters, as well as insurance fees,
the series fees, licenses and travelling expenses. The Court
thus regarded football club X as carrying on business
aiming at success in sports and financial gain, as referred to
in Chapter 30, section 8, of the Finnish CC. It saw the
actual activity of the football club as crucial, regardless of
the financial gain. The same outcome was in judgment by
District Court (R 07/1666).
6.2.2 Are referees and the players of Finnish football clubs
in service of a business?
The crucial question is whether the players of football
clubs are in service of a business, in particular, when they
play as non-professionals. In Finland, the essential ele-
ments of the offence of bribery in business require the
bribed person to hold the status of manager or employee.
Participants in competitions are sometimes employees of
football clubs, but sometimes there is no employment or
any other actual contractual relationship, and thus essential
elements of the provisions of bribery are cannot be mate-
rialised. There is no court decisions whether self-employed
persons with independent contracts are included among
those who can be charged with bribery in business in
Finland.
The defendant in the CoA (R 08/1275) argued that
because of the principle of legality, in service of a
business (Chapter 30, sections 7 and 8, of the Finnish
CC) should not be interpreted as covering registered
associations and the matches they organise. However, in
the case, the CoA regarded the players as being in the
service of a business. In the District Court (R07/7286),
the defendant (M) argued that football club X was not
carrying on a business, but was a non-profit association
and thus he was not in the service of the club. However,
the Court regarded M as a professional player who had
been under the control of the club and not able to play in
any other club during that time. For tax reasons, M was
paid a subsistence allowance, not a salary, of EUR 600
per month. The Court regarded M as being in service of a
business in the meaning of Chapter 30, section 8, of the
Finnish CC.
Although CoAs have seen the football clubs in the
Veikkausliiga and in the First Division as carrying on
business, problems may arise when the actions of persons
engaged in bribery in sports, e.g. referees, athletes,
organisers, marketing people, do not correspond exactly to
the definition of bribery in the business provisions of the
Finnish CC. There may be situations in which a player or a
37 In 1 October 2011, to this Chapter 30, section 8 was added a sub-
section (4).
38 The section was added on the 1st of October 2011.
39 In law amendments (Government Bill 77/2001) and (Government
Bill 8/2005) by which Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption 1999 and EU Council Framework Decision 2003/568/
JHA on combating corruption in the private sector were implemented
in Finnish CC, it was concluded that in the Finnish CC the term
carrying in business (elinkeinotoiminta) is wider than the concept
(liiketoiminta) used in these two instruments.
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referee has no employment or any actual contractual rela-
tionship with a club or any other organisation, and thus the
act cannot be punishable as bribery in business under the
Finnish CC. For example, regarding referees, in the Finnish
court praxis, there are no examples of the application of the
CC sections of bribery when the referee is bribed. The
crucial question here is whether the referee can be held as
being in service of a business.40
Regarding match-manipulation, it has not been consid-
ered in Finnish jurisprudence whether the captain of the
team should get harsher punishments for the same offence
than the other players. It could be reasonable for the cap-
tain of the team if involved in match-manipulation,
because of his/her position, to receive a more severe pun-
ishment. In the District Court case (R 11/900), the captain
of the team received the same punishment for the same
offence as the player. In that case, the court did not even
examine the possibility of giving the captain a harsher
punishment.
Owing to the principle of legality, clarifications of the
provisions concerning the offences of bribery and fraud in
the context of sports would be welcomed to the Finnish
CC, as Sarvikivi suggested already in 2006 (then regarding
the pesa¨pallo-case). Not only concerning Finland, but
generally speaking, Kalb (2011) sees that a special offence
targeted at betting-related match-manipulation could
address the uncertainties posed by existing legislation and
facilitate and encourage the prosecution of such offences.
6.2.3 What can constitute favouring the giver of the bribe?
The aim of the provisions of bribery in business is to
protect the relationship of loyalty between employers and
employees. This loyalty should not be violated. The bribery
is commonly considered, above all, an offence against the
employer of the bribed. CoA (R 11/734) argues that in
cases of match-manipulation, harm is done to the clubs, i.e.
the match-manipulation is conducive to cause losing points
for the clubs. Also, damages to the reputation of the clubs
may come into question as harm. Reputation is an impor-
tant asset of the clubs. But if the corruption is institu-
tionalised in the club, the manipulation cannot then be an
offence against the club and thus the employer. But in this
kind of a situation match-manipulation could be seen as an
offence against the integrity of sport. The integrity of sport
could be regarded as legal good to be protected in the
tackle against match-manipulation.
In the essential elements of acceptance of bribes in
business, it is not required any actual damage to occur
(CoA [R 11/900]). CoA (R 11/734) emphasises that the
materialisation of the essential elements of bribery in
business does not specify that there be conflicting inter-
ests between the briber and the club of the bribed. This
means that if a briber wants bribed players to score as
many goals as possible, the club usually has the same
interest.
The intentional weakening or limitation of players’
performances materialises the essential elements of bribery
in business. Thus, throwing, drawing or limiting the num-
ber of goals or allowing the opposing club to score a goal
materialises the essential elements of bribery in business
(CoA [R 11/734]). However, it is difficult to obtain evi-
dence that players or referees did not play/officiate as well
as they normally do. This is illustrated by the decision of
the District Court (R 11/900): Two Zambian players for the
football club D were convicted for accepting bribes in
business by the District Court (R 11/900) in 2011. Both
players admitted that they had a conversation in a hotel
room with two unknown persons before the Veikkausliiga
match Y-D. These persons wanted these two players to
secure that D would lose the match. However, the players,
according their own words, disagreed. But they agreed
when these two unknown men promised to pay the players
EUR 50.000 if one of them gets red card and one penalty
kick in the match. One of the players got a yellow card in
the match and D lost the match by 5-0. The players were
paid EUR 50.000 after the match. The District Court
concluded that these two players did not play as well as
they normally play. It recognised these players as being
involved in many of the critical mistakes made by the team
D, although it admitted that it is very difficult to conclude
what behaviour in football is intentional or not. These
players were sentenced for bribery in business for condi-
tional imprisonment of seven months. The Disciplinary
committee of Palloliitto imposed a two-year fixed-period
ban of playing on both players (Yle Urheilu 2011). Football
club D dissolved their contracts.
6.2.4 Roles and the liabilities of intermediaries
As illustrated above, TOC groups, can use intermediaries
into persuade persons to agree in match-manipulation. The
Finnish CC provisions regarding bribery or fraud do not
explicitly criminalise the use of intermediaries. However,
even without any express reference, bribery through an
intermediary can be seen to be covered by CC provisions
regarding instigation and abetting (Chapter 5, sections 5
and 6, of the Finnish CC), although there are no High Court
40 The High Court (1987:4) has given a civil law ruling concerning
the contractual relationship between a sport association and a referee
(the case concerned accident indemnity). The court regarded that the
referee did not have employment based on a contract with the Suomen
Pesa¨palloliitto (Finnish Baseball Association) although the Suomen
Pesa¨palloliitto paid remuneration to the referee and also paid the tax
withheld in advance. See, also Tjurin (2001).
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precedents on the matter. However, explicit criminalisation
of the use of intermediaries in either provisions concerning
bribery or in the general part of the Finnish CC would be
welcomed.
6.2.5 Participation in the activity of an OC group
by the briber
The only case where a person participating in the activity
of an OC group has been convicted for match-manipulation
in Finland is the case concerning football club Q: Mr W, a
Singaporean businessman, who had been convicted for
match-manipulation,41 was sentenced by the CoA (R
11/734) to two years in prison for bribery in business. Also,
five players were sentenced from eight to 12 months con-
ditional imprisonment. Mr W bribed football players, the
majority of whom were Zambians, and manipulated several
football matches by football club Q. The players were
either bribed to insure that football club Q would lose the
match or to assure a certain outcome, such as more than
three goals. The bribes were paid either beforehand or
afterwards. If the result was not satisfactory for Mr W, but
the bribes had already been paid, then the players had to
pay back the bribes. The amount of the bribes varied, from
EUR 1.000 (to be shared among the players) to thousands
of euros per player (totalling around EUR 20.000–40.000
per player).42 This case did not include betting by match-
manipulators with Veikkaus. The Disciplinary committee
of Palloliitto imposed a two-year fixed-period ban of
playing on the players (a temporary playing ban had been
imposed, but after the court decision, it was decided that
the ban would be for a total of two years). This ban is
based on the Disciplinary regulations section 3.1(e) (Suo-
men Palloliitto 2012).
In Finnish CC regarding some specific offences, such
as aggravated trafficking in human beings (Chapter 25,
section 3, of Finnish CC) and aggravated customs clear-
ance offence (Chapter 46, section 8, of the Finnish CC),
the offence is aggravated if it is committed within the
framework of a criminal organisation or committed as
part of the activity of a criminal organisation. However, in
chapters of the Finnish CC concerning the bribery
offences, these are not aggravating factors. However,
subject to certain conditions, Chapter 17, section 1(a), of
the Finnish CC can be applied to the crimes of bribery.
This section includes the criteria as to when a person can
be seen as participating in the activity of a criminal
organisation, for example,
when a person who by establishing or organising a
criminal organisation or by recruiting or attempting
to recruit persons for it; by directly or indirectly
giving or collecting funds to finance the criminal
activity of a criminal organisation; by managing
financial affairs that are important for the criminal
organisation; or by actively promoting the accom-
plishment of the aims of a criminal organisation in
another substantial manner participates in the
activities of a criminal organisation with the aim of
committing offence(s) for which the maximum statu-
tory sentence is imprisonment for at least four years
and if such an offence or its punishable attempt is
committed.
Minimum conviction is a fine; maximum imprison-
ment is, at most, two years. This section was, however,
not used by the courts in the case concerning football
club Q (R 11/734) because the maximum sentence for
bribery in business is two years, and thus Chapter 17,
section 1(a), was not applicable. However, currently,
because of the provisions concerning the aggravated
bribery in business impose a maximum sentence of
four years, Chapter 17, section 1(a), is applicable to
these offences.43 This is a major improvement concern-
ing both the general and the special deterrence on match-
manipulation in Finland.
41 In a judgment (R 12/400) given by the District Court in 2012, Mr
W admitted that he has been a member of a group which has been
involved in illegal betting in Asia and manipulated games played in
different countries. The manipulation has taken place by placing
‘trusted’ (i.e. bribed) players in the clubs. The bribes have been faded
out using different kinds of sponsor agreements. Mr W is also
involved in a case (District Court R 12/159) where persons in F (a
football club which was in financial difficulties) are being prosecuted
for money laundering of moneys gained from Mr W. Mr W has told
that the monies he provided to football club F originate from the
betting-related match-manipulation. The District Court dismissed
charges, but the CoA regarded that former managing director and
board chairman of F should have known that 300,000 euros the team
received from a Singaporean company as part of partnership deal in
2010–2011 was obtained through crime.
42 This case has, to some extent, similar features with the case of
Finnish football club M. In that case, a Chinese businessman Z took a
possession of football club M, which was in financial difficulties in
2004. He placed two of his close henchmen, A and B, in the club as
well as a number of foreign players. The club played a match against
Finnish football club H in 2005 with a score of 0–8, and suspicions
arose as to whether the match was rigged. As a result, the club was
fined EUR 10.000 for not having played its best. Z disappeared and no
charges against him were brought.
43 However, in the case of football club Q (R 11/734) commission of
the offence as a member of a group organised for serious offences,
was held as a ground for increasing punishment for W on basis of
Chapter 6, section 5(2), of the Finnish. In this case, Chapter 6,
section 5(2), of the Finnish CC (the methodical nature of the criminal
activity) was also used to increase punishment for W.
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7 Nordic perspective: steps taken in Sweden
and Norway to prevent match-manipulation
Sweden and Norway have taken steps to prevent match-
manipulation. In 2012, Sweden criminalised match-
manipulation by updating its CC concerning bribery
offences. Whereas, Norway has not yet issued any specific
criminalisations regarding match-manipulation, but it has,
in 2012, issued an action plan to target match-manipula-
tion. Next, both actions are briefly analysed, as well as the
reasons behind these actions.
7.1 Sweden
The study of Bra˚ (2007) did not report any signs of
bribery in sports although it analysed 147 prosecuted
corruption cases reported to Riksenheten mot korruption
(Anti-Corruption Unit) in Sweden during 2003–2005.
Neither Cars (2001), in his study, identifies any cases of
bribery in sport in Sweden. In addition, the Swedish
authorities did not provide any information of such
cases to the report made by KEA European Affairs
(2012).
On the 1st of July 2012, the new bribery provisions,
criminalising match-manipulation, were introduced into the
Swedish CC. Chapter 10, section 5a, of the Swedish CC
now criminalises bribe-taking, covering also
… a participant or steward in a contest that is the
subject of widely organised betting and it is the
matter of a undue benefit of his or her performance or
duties at the event.
Chapter 10, section 5b, of the Swedish CC criminalises
bribe-giving in situations referred to in Chapter 10, sec-
tion 5a. The maximum penalty for the basic form of an
offence is two years imprisonment; the minimum penalty
is a fine.
As aggravating factors (Chapter 10, section 5c, of the
Swedish CC), both bribe-giving and bribe-taking are seen
… if the offence involved the abuse of a particularly
responsible position or attack on a person holding
such a position, aimed significant value or was part
of a crime that was carried out systematically or in a
large scale or otherwise was of a particularly dan-
gerous nature.
The maximum penalty for aggravated forms of bribe-
giving and bribe-taking is six years imprisonment; the
minimum is six months.
The reasons behind the introduction of this new crim-
inalisation relating to match-manipulation are given in
Beta¨nkande av utredningen om mutor (SOU 2010:38).
It was seen that because of the large amounts of money
involved in sports and in sport betting, there is a risk that
match-manipulation can become common in Sweden.
Also, it was emphasised that the old bribery legislation
did not cover the situation when the players do not have
an employee status in the club. Furthermore, the non-
criminal sanctions were not seen as adequate to tackle
match-manipulation. However, e.g. the possibility of the
doctors to influence the sporting events was seen as so
limited that they were not covered by this new criminal-
isation. These new criminalisations cover the bribes given
afterwards.
7.2 Norway
The match-manipulation in Norway has been a little-
known phenomenon until very recently. (Norwegian
Action Plan against Match-Fixing 2012) In summer 2012,
Norway’s football association (NFF) reported a suspected
match-manipulation in its second division to the national
police. It was suspected that players in a Norwegian foot-
ball club have been approached by organised criminals in
an attempt to manipulate the matches for betting reasons.
The case is currently under police investigation (Parkkinen
2012).
Later in 2012, the Ministry of Culture of Norway pub-
lished the Norwegian Action Plan Against Match-Fixing
2013–2015 (Nasjonal handlingsplan mot kampfiksing i
idretten 2013–2015). The plan establishes certain areas of
importance in combating match-manipulation. The objec-
tives of the plan are: increasing the knowledge of match-
manipulation to prevent, uncover and respond to match-
manipulation in sports; to monitor and regulate the gaming
industry; and to strengthen the laws and regulations as well
as the participation in the international efforts against
match-manipulation. Emphasis is put on establishing ethi-
cal guidelines, training and the educational programmes on
match-manipulation. Furthermore, the importance of
international co-operation and information sharing is
highlighted.
8 The challenges in the prevention of match-
manipulation
… the criminal underworld is now heavily engaged in
ways that, if unchecked, will seriously jeopardize the
future of modern sport (Howman 2011).
As Council of EU (2012) remarks, because of the
transnational nature of betting-related match-manipulation,
cross-border co-operation of investigative and judicial
Int Sports Law J (2013) 13:268–286 281
123
authorities (Europol, Eurojust and Interpol)44 as well as rele-
vant ministries is vital. It emphasis that is essential to ensure
the coordination between different stakeholders, like sport
movement, betting operators, gambling regulators, public
authorities and law enforcement authorities. Betting-related
match-manipulation by TOC groups needs international and
regional instruments to combat it. In this chapter, the actions
taken by the international and regional actors to combat
match-manipulation are discussed as well as the steps taken in
Finland to tackle the problem are illustrated.
8.1 Transnational problem needs the inter-state
co-operation
The main and the only truly international instrument for
tackling corruption is the UN Convention against Corrup-
tion 2003 (UNCAC)45, which requires its signatories to
establish criminal and other offences to cover different acts
of corruption. Although Article 21 of UNCAC concerns
private sector corruption, its active and passive forms (the
provision is not mandatory), it does not explicitly crimi-
nalise the match-manipulation.46
The other important actor in the anti-corruption field has
been the Council of Europe. Its Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption 1999 was entered into force in 2002, aiming
to coordinate the criminalisation e.g. of active and passive
bribery in the private sector. However, these non-manda-
tory provisions do not explicitly deal with match-manipu-
lation. Currently, the negotiations concerning an
international legal instrument on match-manipulation by
the Council of Europe have started. This is a natural step
because the Council of Europe has, in addition to corrup-
tion, regulated many types of transnational crime, such as
money laundering and OC.47
The EU lacks its own special instrument concerning
manipulation of sports results. Regarding the EU, the
manipulation of sports results falls under the scope of the
EU Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on com-
bating corruption in the private sector. But it remains
unclear as to what extent it applies to betting-motivated
cases, in particular concerning non-professional sports
(KEA European Affairs 2012). Also, the Member States of
the EU have not implemented the Framework Decision as
they should have (European Commission 2007). The study
of Match-fixing in Sport 2012 by KEA European Affairs
recommends that the EU should expand the scope of
Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating cor-
ruption in the private sector, impose surveillance obliga-
tions for betting operators and to reinforce surveillance in
betting activities. The EU could also modify the Directive
2005/60 on the prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing
to cover sport betting organisations, because Article 2 of
the Directive does not currently include the organisers of
sport-betting activities (KEA European Affairs 2012).
However, the EU has tackled the match-manipulation in
several different ways. According to the Resolution of the
EU’s Council Work Plan for Sport 2011–2014, to develop
the integrity in sport, the focus should be put on the fight
against match-manipulation. In 2011a, b, the EU Council
Conclusions on combating match-fixing were adopted. The
Conclusions observe that match-manipulation is one of the
most significant threats to contemporary sport. It is seen to
damage the image of sport by jeopardising the integrity and
unpredictability of sporting competitions and, thus, con-
tradicting the fundamental values of sport, such as integrity
and fair play. The Conclusions call on the Commission, the
Member States and/or other stakeholders to adopt different
measures to increase awareness, e.g. the setting up of
educational programmes, the promotion of information
exchanges and the enhancement of international coopera-
tion. Furthermore, in 2012, the Communication towards a
comprehensive European framework for online gambling
by the European Commission was issued. In 2014, the
Commission will announce the adoption of a Recommen-
dation on best practices in the prevention and combating of
betting-related match-manipulation.
However, although the actions by the EU in preventing
match-manipulation are essential, it is of utmost impor-
tance that any action against match-manipulation should go
beyond the borders of the EU27. An international instru-
ment with mandatory provisions covering different aspects
of match-manipulation should be established. This kind of
an instrument would enable the avoidance of safe havens,
i.e. countries with weak regulation of match-manipula-
tion. This kind of action would remove the national
law variables, close legislative loopholes concerning the
44 Europol and Eurojust are actively involved in match-manipulation
because the cases of match-manipulation often imply OC. At the EU
level in the field of sport the co-operation of law enforcement
agencies has traditionally been focused on spectator violence but the
match-manipulation is a new area for cross-border co-operation.
European Commission (2012) Recommendation for a Council
Decision Authorising the European Commission to participate, on
behalf of the EU, in the negotiations for an international convention
of the Council of Europe to combat the manipulation of sports results
(Brussels, 13 November 2012, COM(2012) 655 final).
45 The Convention adopted by the General Assembly by resolution
58/4 of 31 October 2003.
46 Furthermore, UNCAC and United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (General Assembly resolution 55/25
of 15 November 2000) both include the provisions of money
laundering and protection of witnesses and reporting persons, as well
as establishes legal frameworks for international co-operation.
47 The actions against TOC in match-manipulation should be seen,
not only on the global level, but also at a national level, as a part of
the general actions against OC (Norwegian Action Plan Against
Match-Fixing 2012).
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criminalisations of match-manipulation and strengthen
interstate co-operation, which is essential in preventing,
detecting and investigating match-manipulation. This kind
of an instrument would also include guidelines on how to
facilitate international co-operation in the cross-border
cases of match-manipulation.
When considering the involvement of TOC groups in
match-manipulation, sport betting is a poorly monitored
activity compared to other activities of TOC groups like
drugs trafficking (Boniface et al. 2012). More cooperation
is needed between betting operators, sport bodies and
competent authorities, such as gambling regulators at the
national and international levels (European Commission
2012). There is a need for a global regulatory system
concerning betting-related match-manipulation. One option
is to establish a new global institution to control transna-
tional match-manipulation, like the World Anti-Doping
Agency (WADA) in the field of anti-doping with national
sub-agencies.
8.2 Steps to be taken in Finland
In Europe, some countries have introduced specific crimi-
nal law provisions to address certain types of match-
manipulation.48 The steps being taken in Finland to combat
match-manipulation as well as what kinds of steps should
be taken in near future are discussed next.
Both FIFA and UEFA regard that designating match-
manipulation as a specific offence in the national CC would
be helpful (KEA European Affairs 2012). Currently, the
criminalisation of match-manipulation in Finland is
nowhere in sight. Based on the results of this research,
some changes could be made in the Finnish CC to the
provisions on bribery in business: the offence of bribery in
business should be considered aggravated when (1) a crime
has been committed by a person acting on behalf of an OC
group or (2) the offence involves management. Also, it
should be taken account that referees may be potential
targets of bribery, and it would be essential that they would
be explicitly covered by the bribery provisions. These
would be important steps because of the principle of
legality.49 It should also be taken into account that crimi-
nals may look for the weakest regulated jurisdictions or
jurisdiction with low sanctions for match-manipulation.
Thus, it should be ensured that, in Finland, the sanctions for
match-manipulation are effective and dissuasive to have a
future general (and also special) deterrence effect. Fur-
thermore, it should be ensured that a player, referee or an
official banned in one country for match-manipulation is
not able to take part in a sporting competition somewhere
else (KEA European Affairs 2012).
It is essential that for investigative authorities adequate
tools are provided to detect match-manipulation. For
example, in Finland Chapter 5a, Section 2, of Coercive
Measures Act (450/1987) does not mention the offence of
bribery in business. Thus, interception of telecommunica-
tions is not possible what comes to the offence of bribery in
business. The forthcoming Coercive Measures Act (in
force from 1st of January 2014) does not bring any change
to this problem.
It appears that persons and sports federations are afraid
or reluctant to reveal their suspicions or even their
knowledge about bribery because they fear that it may have
a negative effect on sponsors and audiences (Brasseur
2012). In addition those involved may be reluctant to give
testimony if an OC group is involved in a case. Thus,
anonymous witnessing plays an important role concerning
the cases of match-manipulation50. Furthermore, it should
be carefully analysed whether to introduce measures in
Finland to exonerate those who inform the police about
match-manipulation from criminal liability (whistleblow-
ing rules), or whether the action of sports persons who fails
to notify the appropriate persons of wrongdoing about
which s/he is aware should be criminalised. In addition,
because match-manipulation takes place in a multi-coun-
try-setting jurisdictional questions need to be made clearer
e.g. in Finland Veikkaus is no longer the one being
deceived as the bets are placed in international betting
agencies on Finnish matches.
In Finland, training and awareness-raising programmes
should be established for young amateur and professional
athletes, referees, support staff and other relevant persons
to inform them on different forms of corruption in sports
and the regulations on betting. One way to influence the
motivation of potential offenders is to raise their con-
sciousness about the consequences of the act. The con-
sciousness of the phenomenon of match-manipulation of
potential victims and capable guardians should also be
raised. Also, the training of young players from economi-
cally disadvantaged backgrounds and countries should
especially be emphasized. (Interpol 2012) Effective
48 These countries are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Russian Federation, Sweden and the United Kingdom
(Chiaromonte 2012). For example, the UK Bribery Act 2010
introduces a new criminal offence of failure of a commercial
organisation to prevent bribery. Thus, senior employees can be found
personally liable for actions of other members of staff in their
organisation if they have not taken ‘adequate procedures’ to prevent
the bribery.
49 For more discussion on a theory of criminalisation and legal
constraints to criminal legislation in Finland, see Melander (2008).
50 See a proposal for anonymous witnessing in Finland: Anonyymi
todistaminen mahdolliseksi vakavimmissa rikoksissa. Oikeusministe-
rio¨ 9 November 2012. http://valtioneuvosto.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/
tiedote/fi.jsp?toid=1928&c=0&moid=1939&oid=369109 (Accessed
18 September 2013).
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education, anti-corruption units, sporting governing bodies
as well as players’ and officials’ associations all have a key
role to play in rooting out bribery in sports. It is crucial that
players and also other persons involved in sports are edu-
cated about the importance of the applicable reporting51
requirements and the seriousness of the consequences that
any failure to comply may cause. (Smith 2012) In addition,
the clubs should not live beyond their income but to be able
to pay adequate salaries on time. As Council of EU (2012)
suggests, to improve the protection of the integrity in sport,
the attention should be paid also to good governance
principles like sound financial management, risk manage-
ment and transparency. It also emphasis that there should
by national legislation be limited access to illegal gambling
offers (especially in third countries) through technological
means. Furthermore, it sees that Member States should
consider the establishment of a national contact point
which would enable meetings of relevant actors involved in
combating the match-manipulation. In addition, Council of
EU (2012) sees important that at the national level ade-
quate protection of witnesses and whistle-blowers is
considered.
As one important way to prevent match-manipulation,
Hill (2009) stresses that it should be ensured that each
position in the league is rewarded with certain monetary
value. He sees this as important because if the clubs do not
care whether their ranking in the league is in the middle
(not facing relegation but neither at the top), the club may
not care towards the end of the season whether it will lose
some matches or not. This is clearly seen in the CoA case
(R08/1275), where L tried to bribe the goalkeeper of the
football club V. L wanted the goalkeeper to influence the
match in a way that football club V would lose the match.
When calling the goalkeeper, L tried to assure him that the
rest of the matches in the season were meaningless,
because the club could not either win the series or be rel-
egated from the series.
To effectively tackle betting-related match-manipula-
tion, some general actions, especially concerning the bet-
ting aspect, should be taken: Betting operators should not
allow gamblers to place bets anonymously in any situation;
Sports-betting operators should refrain from offering
chances to place bets that are regarded as very risky,
especially betting on competitions between the most vul-
nerable (e.g. athletes under 18, amateur competitions and,
in football, lower-division professional competitions)
should be prohibited; And the states should work with
national and international betting operators to introduce
effective procedures for detecting suspicious betting (Bures
2008, p. 14; Brasseur 2012; Boniface et al. 2012; McLaren
2008).
9 Closing comments
The deregulated growth of sports betting in an
environment where organised crime and corruption
in general are extensive, is particularly deadly for
sport (Boniface et al. 2012).
This research illustrates that match-manipulation can be
both betting- and non-betting-related. In the former way of
manipulation, the match is intended to result in economic
gain through betting. The Internet has created a new play-
ground for betting, and this may attract criminals into
manipulating matches and betting on them. In the latter, the
aim can be to qualify for a higher level of competition.
Betting-related match-manipulation can be used by crimi-
nals, e.g. by TOC groups, to launder their illegally-obtained
money. This means that match-manipulation can in some
cases be closely connected to TOC groups and money
laundering, thus, being at the focal point of three transna-
tional crimes: corruption, OC and money laundering.
The known cases and jurisprudence of match-manipu-
lation are extremely rare in Finland; for example, there is no
High Court jurisprudence on the matter. However, this
study illustrates that football in Finland is vulnerable to
match-manipulation for many reasons: in Finland the
football is played during the summer months, some clubs
are in financial difficulty, players’ salaries are low, and the
playing contracts can be short and fixed-term. Also,
awareness and knowledge on match-manipulation is in its
infancy in Finland. For example, in Finland, there is neither
any organ specialised in the prevention of match-manipu-
lation nor any general anti-corruption organ. Indeed, in
Finland, no single actor is responsible for prevention of
match-manipulation. Furthermore, no national operating
plan has yet been developed to prevent match-manipulation.
The Finnish CC does not explicitly criminalise match-
manipulation: there are no separate provisions concerning
match-manipulation, and Government Bills remain silent
on the issue. The provisions on bribery in business as well
as fraud are used in cases of match-manipulation. How-
ever, the investigation authorities should be given appro-
priate and adequate tools to detect and to investigate the
match-manipulation, e.g. concerning the Coercive Mea-
sures Act (450/1987). Furthermore, in Finland, the example
of the criminalisation of match-manipulation given by
Sweden could be followed. In addition, target hardening,
51 For example, Prevention and combating of corrupt activities act
2004 in South Africa has a separate criminalisation of offences in
respect to corruption activities relating to sport. The act criminalises
both influencing the run of the play and the outcome of a sporting
event (Chapter 15(b) (i) (aa). According to Chapter 15(b) (i) (bb) of
the act, there is an obligation to report to the police, to a sporting body
or to a regulatory authority.
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more social control and international co-operation are
needed to tackle match-manipulation. Interstate co-opera-
tion is of the utmost importance in detecting and investi-
gating the cases.
Finland needs a stronger political will to combat match-
manipulation. In Finland, it remains to be seen whether
after these court cases the table is now clean or whether
these cases handled by courts are only the tip of the ice-
berg. Football is not the only discipline vulnerable to the
manipulation, and more research is needed on different
aspects on match-manipulation, also concerning other sport
disciplines. To deter and to detect match-manipulation the
emphasis should be put on improving the monitoring of
online betting, as well as on cooperation between law
enforcement agencies, betting operators, players, ex-play-
ers and sports officials. These preventive actions are
important because as a result of match-manipulation, sports
can become unappealing, not only to spectators, but also to
sponsors. This can be a road to the destruction of sports.
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